Fukushima Part 1- An enviro-technical disaster

In last week’s blog I came to the conclusion that nuclear energy is needed in some capacity over the coming century to cut carbon emissions, and support a gradual transition to a reliance on renewables. However whilst I affirm that combating climate change without any help from nuclear energy would be difficult if not impossible, a fully-fledged investment in atomic energy as the dominant resource is a larger commitment, which comes with higher risk.

In recent years the word ‘Fukushima’ has shadowed any commitment, withdrawal , or decision for that matter upon nuclear energy. Twenty-five years on from Chernobyl and taking place in the 3^rd largest economy in the World, it showed the vulnerability of all nations to nuclear accidents, and brought the safety and sustainability of a nuclear future to the fore.  The impacts of the event are somewhat up in the air and will very likely not be truly realised until many decades after the event. Rather than assessing the plethora of research and commentary examining the effects post-meltdown, I want to focus on whether the nuclear accident at Fukushima is better summarised as an environmental disaster, or as a 'techno-political' mistake.

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster  in March 2011 was classed a level 7 case on the Nuclear Event scale, the only other level 7 case is the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 (Source:fukushima.org)

Fukushima was a triple disaster: a magnitude 9.0 Earthquake, followed by a 14m Tsunami and the subsequent meltdown of three out of the six nuclear reactors at the Daichi Nuclear plant (Pritchard, 2012). So obviously we need cut some flack for the nuclear industry, without the magnitude 9.0 Earthquake there would have been no call for the reactors to go into emergency shutdown, therefore the self generating electricity supply would have remained on. Without a 14m tsunami ploughing into the east coast of Japan some 50 minutes later, the backup diesel generators would themselves of remained functional, pumping water to elicit the cooling of the plant’s six reactors and allowing the plant to serenely avoid a catastrophe. 

This account is perhaps the closest nuclear supporters can come to claiming a victory at Fukushima and many have. Alan Waltar, president of the American Nuclear society recently described Fukushima as ‘Nuclear’s finest hour’.  He argues that a plant designed for an 8.2 magnitude Earthquake survived an Earthquake some five times larger, the reactors shutdown and the containment stayed in tact, the only letdown was in the external power supply.

If we view the events of Fukushima as a series of isolated safety tests this isn’t far from the truth, the disaster would have almost undoubtedly been averted if the diesel generators had not been flooded. However when taking a more circumferential view of the nuclear industry, and considering characteristics inherent to nuclear energy, a different perspective on the accident may be fashioned.   

One of the specific characteristics of nuclear power, which relates very closely to Fukushima, is that nuclear reactors can never be turned off (Pritchard, 2012). A nuclear chain reaction may be stopped and the reactor is at least in theory, safely shut down, however the fuel still produces heat. This must be dissipated by continuously pumping cooled water around the reactor, fail to do so and you risk eventual meltdown:

Radioactive decay continues>more heat> boils off stationary water>water level falls>exposes fuel to steam and air>fuel damage>even greater temperature rise>>>meltdown>radioactive materials released  

The reactor cores at Fukushima were ‘safely’ shutdown a major difference from Chernobyl however heat in the reactors languished and with no electricity to ferry the shutdown reactors to safety, damage was inevitable.

Another characteristic of nuclear energy is that if an accident does happen the consequences are severe and long lasting given the very nature of the fuel being used. If a meltdown occurs and radioactive elements are able to escape into the atmosphere or surrounding waterways, they are a latent threat to the environment and human beings for many decades. Radioactive decay is random, yet enduring and consistent when scaling through time and space. 

Geigher counter measuring radiation dose rate outside the Fukushima I nuclear plant,. The half life of some components of spent nuclear fuel are short however others like Plutonium-239  have half lives in excess of 20000 years accounting for the long lasting estrangement of areas surrounding the Fukushima plant (Source: Telegraph, 2013)

When considering these inherent risks, terming Fukushima a mere accident, serves to minimize the role played by the technology being used (Perrow, 2007). After all without the tsunami there may have been no nuclear accident but without a nuclear power plant there would have been no risk in the first place. Technology of course is not self-generating and some of the blame must be attributed to the political decision by the Japanese government to back nuclear power in a country highly prone to natural hazards.

Map showing the location of Nuclear power plants (blue dots) against Earthquake activity since 1979, Japan borders a region with frequent and powerful earthquakes (red), the government turned to Nuclear energy in part due to a scarcity in natural resources such as coal and gas (Source: maptd.com)

In my opinion I don't believe a victory should be claimed for nuclear power at Fukushima, but at the same time I feel the plant's demise shouldn't be used to completely rule out future investment in the industry. I see Fukushima as a fork in the road, the extreme circumstances should be taken into consideration, but at its heart the nature of the accident is systematic of the technology being used, not extraordinary and unexpected (Perrow, 2007). With this in mind a possibilistic rather than probabilistic mindset should be adopted by the industry, and governments should consider a'worst case scenario' based on their geographical location.

In next week's blog I will look at the lessons to be learnt from Fukushima in more detail.

Thanks for reading!

Book References

Perrow, 2007 The Next Catastrophe : Reducing Our Vunerabilities to Natural , Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters, Princeton, Princeton University Press